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* The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the offical view ot the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
1 A home country is the country where the parent bank of a banking group is registered. A host country is where subsidiaries or branches are based.
iNtRoDuCtioN
On 12 September 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) announced a broad agreement on the 
most important parameters of a new regulatory system 
commonly referred to as Basel III and a transition period to 
allow banks sufficient time to implement the regulatory 
changes. The importance of this set of proposals lies in the 
fact that the G20 countries accept its principles as binding, 
thus turning them into global standards. Fundamentally, the 
proposals are based on macro-prudential considerations 
and strive to reinforce the stability of the financial system 
on two levels. On the level of individual institutions, they 
aim to strengthen the system’s resilience to possible future 
shocks by improving their capacity to weather crises, 
whereas on the systemic level these proposals are meant to 
manage and contain the risk of a systemic spill-over and 
procyclicality. A transition period of several years available 
for raising additional capital and meeting higher liquidity 
and other risk management standards is intended to 
minimise restraints of activity in the banking sector.
A number of unresolved issues remain in relation to the 
implementation of new regulations, which will require 
decisions at the national or European level. From a national 
perspective, one particularly delicate aspect will be 
decisions on issues delegated to supervisory authorities, as 
these have a direct impact on the system as a whole. Such 
issues include the requirement on the FX denomination of 
liquidity buffers, activating and calibrating capital buffers 
in relation to excessive credit growth, or approving their 
drawdown in post-crisis periods. A further possible macro-
prudential challenge could arise if − in response to tighter 
regulations − risks assumed by the banking system are 
shifted outside the sector.
Given the structural characteristics of the Hungarian 
banking system, another relevant concept may be to 
strengthen systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFI’s) and to seek loss-absorbing capacities other than the 
central budget should a crisis situation occur. As the Basel 
Committee has only communicated its intentions in this 
field, a toolkit for crisis management has yet to be designed 
and those authorised to identify such systemically important 
entities have yet to be named. We expect this issue to be a 
source of further conflicts between home and host 
countries.1 
Besides briefly presenting the Basel III framework, this 
paper investigates the changes with the most profound 
impacts, i.e. the new liquidity and capital requirement 
standards. In addition to identifying the direct impacts on 
the domestic and the European banking system, I will 
present the forecasts that have been or can be made in 
relation to indirect macro-economic impacts using 
information available prior to the publication of this paper. 
Finally, I will briefly summarize those issues that domestic 
decision-makers will have to address, i.e. matters in the 
new framework to be treated from Hungary’s standpoint 
with great care.
Anikó Szombati: Systemic level impacts of 
Basel iii on Hungary and europe*
Based on data available in the autumn of 2010, this paper describes the impacts which the most significant elements of 
the Basel III standards − that is, the new capital and liquidity requirements − are expected to have on the domestic and 
European banking system. Overall, we do not expect the new regulations to exert any significant direct effects on the 
Hungarian banking system. Nevertheless, some decline in GDP growth at the national level cannot be ruled out, to a 
lesser extent due to movements in the European money and capital markets, and to a greater extent due to impacts 
directly through parent banks. It is important to stress that calculations used as the basis for the industry and regulatory 
conclusions presented in this paper are relevant to a specific date and rely on different regulatory packages. Therefore, 
a repeated review of the regulatory package will have to be carried out prior to its implementation.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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SuMMARy oF tHe eleMeNtS oF tHe 
ReGulAtioN
At the level of both individual banks and the banking system 
as a whole, the proposals of the Basel III framework are 
intended to remedy the market, supervisory and regulatory 
failures that played a key role in the evolvement and 
severity of the crisis. Following national implementation, 
the package will enter into force in 2013, but as far as areas 
requiring fundamental adjustments are concerned and 
wherever completely new rules apply, the Basel Committee 
has adopted a plan for a gradual phase-in. Thus, the rules 
will, in a final and complete form, become binding 
requirements starting from early 2019 (see Annex).
Capital regulations
The fundamental purpose of the changes is to improve 
banks’ ability to withstand shocks. Banks’ primary line of 
defence against unexpected situations is regulatory capital. 
However at the outbreak of the crisis it turned out that those 
parts of capital which were meant to be available for 
immediate loss absorption proved insufficient. The tightening 
of capital regulations is based on two main pillars.
As a first pillar, the Basel regulators narrowed the range of 
components which can be recognised as regulatory capital 
and prescribed stricter limits in order to ensure compliance 
with group-level capital adequacy requirements. However, 
since tightening the range of eligible regulatory capital 
components can − given their current capital level − easily 
prompt banks to make asset-side adjustments in response 
to the new requirements, the Basel Committee adopted a 
transition period of 10 years during which entities will be 
able to improve the quality of their regulatory capital 
through retained earnings, new issuances and downscaling 
of their non-debt instruments.
As a second pillar, the Committee also defined a new three-
tier capital requirement-structure. Under the decision, the 
current capital requirement will change as follows:
•   common  equity  (core)  tier  12/RWA3: 2% (currently) → 
3.5% (from 2013) → 7% (from 2019)
•   tier 14/RWA: 4% (currently) → 4.5% (from 2013) → 8.5% 
(from 2019)
•   regulatory capital/rWA: 8% (currently) → 8% (from 2013) 
→ 10.5% (from 2019)
The increase in required capital levels is attributable chiefly 
to the introduction of the capital conservation buffer (+2.5%). 
Nevertheless, these required capital ratios are by no means 
considered the maximum values. In the event of excessive 
credit growth, national supervisory authorities may decide to 
prescribe an additional capital buffer (up to +2.5%) to 
mitigate banks’ pro-cyclicality (Table 1). Its extent would be 
based on the debt-to-GDP ratio and on an indicator reflecting 
deviation from the ratio’s equilibrium level. If the debt-to-
GDP ratio grows to excessive levels, a buffer add-on will be 
required at the level of the banking system, and vice versa. 
table 1
How capital buffers − aimed at containing procyclicality either at individual or at systemic level − work
Capital conservation buffer Counter-cyclical buffer
Purpose
Strengthening of the shock absorption 
ability of individual banks 
Maintaining the banking system’s lending 
capacity during recessions 
Mechanism of generating the buffer
On-going, supervisory authority derogation 
in the event of a shock
Periodically, on the basis of supervisory 
authority discretion, prescribed at a 
systemic level
Basis of capital buffer generation
A fixed target value over the minimum 
capital requirement
In proportion to excessive credit growth: 
dominantly in proportion to the widening of 
the debt-to-GDP gap, gradually
Extent Core Tier 1 + 2.5% 0−2.5%
Date of introduction 2016−2019 From 2016
Use of buffer
In justified cases, on a case-by-case basis 
for loss absorption
In the case of a systemic level shock for loss 
absorption
Sanctions
Restrictions on distributions from capital 
instruments
Restrictions on distributions from capital 
instruments
2   The Hungarian equivalent of ‘Common Equity (Core) Tier 1’ is ‘elsődleges alapvető tőke’, and refers to the sum of an entity’s subscribed capital, capital 
reserves and retained earnings. 
3 Risk-weighted assets and the capital requirement for market and operational risks multiplied by a credit conversion factor
4   Tier 1 (T1) capital comprises Core Tier 1 capital and certain non-maturing, eligible hybrid capital instruments granting entitlement to special 
payments. Tier 2 (T2) capital ranks next in terms of loss absorption capacity. Regulatory capital can be interpreted as the sum of the two (T1+T2).MNB BulletiN • DeceMBer 2010 35
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The problem we are presented with here is two-fold: one is 
how we define ‘excessive’ credit growth, and the other is 
whether the definition of capital requirements is consistent 
across individual countries.
Liquidity regulations
It is the first time that liquidity standards have been 
introduced in the Basel Committee’s proposals. The new 
liquidity requirements are based on two ratios. One is the 
liquidity coverage ratio (LCR)5 that enables banks to survive 
stress periods up to 30 days. Although compliance with the 
ratio will have to be disclosed from 2011 onwards, it will 
only take effect as a binding rule in 2015. The other 
indicator is the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), which will 
also be phased in over a relatively long period, with regular 
calculations to start in 2012. It will become a binding 
requirement in 2018. The purpose of introducing the ratio 
is to reduce maturity mismatch on banks’ balance sheet, 
i.e. regulators intend to enforce that long-term assets to be 
financed by liabilities with maturity of over one year.
Other regulatory requirements
Another new indicator is the leverage ratio, which is 
intended to efficiently curb excessive risk taking by 
imposing limitations on the proportion of on- and off-
balance sheet assets and Tier 1 capital. Although, in 
principle, a leverage ratio − tentatively set at 3% − will have 
to be observed by large international banks from 2011 
onwards, the Basel Committee will only set a definitive 
limit prior to the introduction of the ratio as a binding 
requirement starting 2018. The impact of leverage ratio-
based requirements across the banking system will, to a 
large extent, depend on the accounting method selected 
for the recognition of off-balance sheet items, the extent of 
close-out netting that is permitted for accounting purposes 
and whether the selected limit (currently 3%) will narrow 
the room for manoeuvre for certain business models under 
standard circumstances as well, or will only function as a 
backstop measure preventing excessive risk-taking.
A further component of the package of regulatory proposals 
is aimed at reducing the risk of contagion at the systemic 
level. Higher capital adequacy requirements and tighter 
liquidity management criteria have been set for systemically 
important financial institutions. Furthermore, supervisory 
discretion may be exercised in converting certain senior 
creditor positions into loss-absorbing capital components, 
thereby enabling these institutions to better resist shocks.
In response to further requirements affecting interbank 
transactions, capital requirements for the trading book will 
rise by three- to four-fold on average6, as well as those for 
counterparty risk. The regulation recognizes that counterparty 
risk emerges not only when a partner organisation goes 
bankrupt, but also when its creditworthiness deteriorates 
materially; furthermore, higher correlation ratios will be 
allocated to positions towards financial institutions.
A move to clear derivatives contracts through central 
counterparties (CCPs) wherever possible as another form of 
counterparty risk management is expected to further 
reduce systemic level risks. However, a standardised 
structure of transactions and an expected rise in charges 
may also narrow market depth.
quANtiFyiNG tHe ANtiCiPAteD 
iMPACtS oF tHe FRAMeWoRK
Each of the recommendations serving as the cornerstones 
of the regulation is intended to address a typical phenomenon 
that contributed to the evolvement of the current crisis. A 
quantitative impact study (C-QIS) by the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) aimed at quantifying 
the impacts of the recommendations on the banking system 
seeks to assess, on the basis of data available for individual 
banks as of 31 December 2009, the aggregate impact of the 
recommendations and provide assistance with the final 
calibration of individual ratios.7
Since the announcement of the regulatory proposals in 
2009, a number of analyses investigating the macroeconomic 
impacts of the tighter rules during the transition period and 
over a longer horizon have been published. One of the most 
referenced industry studies, an analysis by the Institute of 
International Finance (IIF), assesses the aggregate impact of 
international regulatory initiatives8 published up to June 
2010 on the long-term macro-economic performance of the 
G3 countries9.
5 LCR = liquid assets/30-day cumulative net cash outflow>=100%, NFSR (net stable funding ratio) = stable funds/stable assets to be financed>=100%.
6   Overall, based on Quantitative Impact Study 6 (C-QIS), this will mean a 6.4% rise in capital requirements for large European banks. Changes are not 
expected to affect medium-size banks, as they are less active in securitisation and trading.
7   The study involved 48 large international (Group 1 or G1) and 186 medium-size (Group 2 or G2) banks, covering 70% of the European Union’s banking 
sector at a consolidated level.
8   Thus, in addition to the 2009 proposals of the Basel Committee, it also dealt with the aggregate impacts of an international bank levy and additional 
requirements for large, systemically important entities, revised accounting standards, enhanced capital requirements for the trading book and of some 
of the latest restrictions (also named Volcker rules) that are applicable in the USA.
9 USA, Japan and euro area countries.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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In order to adopt an official regulatory stance, two separate 
workgroups of the BCBS carried out separate analyses on 
the anticipated temporary and permanent macro-economic 
impacts related to the Basel III switchover.10 Rather than 
specifically examining the effects of different calibrations 
under the new regulations, these analyses provide an 
assessment of the effects of 1 percent tightening of capital 
and liquidity requirements on the GDP path.
Relying on these three sources, as well as on a Hungary-
specific analysis (Somogyi and Trinh, 2010) by the staff of 
International Training Center for Bankers (Bankárképző) and 
on MNB’s own methodology, I will in the following section 
present the effects of a rise in expected capital levels and 
of the introduction of liquidity standards on the domestic 
and European banking system, along with the estimated 
macro-economic costs of the necessary adjustments.
Impacts of the capital regulations
Banking system-related and macro-economic impacts in 
the EU
Under the first pillar of the Basel III capital requirements 
(primarily tightening the eligible capital base by deductions 
from common equity), the quantity of Core Tier 1 capital 
suitable for loss absorption will decrease significantly in the 
European banking system. Furthermore, under the second 
pillar (a higher Core Tier 1 ratio), there will be a marked 
rise in expected capital levels (Table 2). One look at the 
Core Tier 1 ratio forming the basis of three-tier capital 
requirement-structure reveals that, at the end of 2009, the 
capital ratio for all large European banks was well below 
the 7% level that is scheduled to take effect starting 2019, 
due, fundamentally, to a narrower range of eligible capital 
components. Between 2013 and 2019 these banks will have 
to raise, either in the market or by retaining earnings, EUR 
270 bn in Core Tier 1 capital, which is equal to 58% of their 
current, similarly high-quality capital. The capital ratio of 
medium-size banks is somewhat higher, and thus, in their 
case the required Core Tier 1 capital only amount to 17% of 
their current holdings.
The heightened capital requirements pose two problems. 
One is the uncertainty around the success of raising capital 
and the costs involved. The current money market 
environment remains less than favourable; other factors 
which make raising capital even more difficult are the 
withdrawal of capital support provided by governments 
during the crisis, along with their substitution with funds 
originated from the markets on the one hand, and the 
materialization of prospective (private and sovereign) loan 
losses identified in stress tests exercises on the other. The 
question is whether capital markets in Europe can, in the 
face of deteriorating profitability, supply a sufficient 
quantity of funds for CET1 to be adequately increased.
Another risk related to the increased capital requirements 
is the acceleration of the banking system’s balance sheet 
adjustment and the macro-economic implications of such 
acceleration. The IIF analysis, which − due to the fact that 
it was published in June 2010 − could not rely on the 
finalised standards,11 projects a rather dramatic fall over 
the transition period (Table 3). Our forecast reveals that, 
from among the three regions studied, the euro area will 
have to make the largest growth sacrifice: its GDP is 
expected to drop by 4.4% over a span of 8 years. The 
underlying reason for this is that bank intermediation is 
dominant in the euro area, and the weight of the banking 
system is high in the economy.
table 2
Capital impacts of the Basel iii requirements expressed as a percentage of Common equity tier 1 at the 
european level
Current Cet 1 ratio
under Basel i






As a proportion of 
the currently 
available capital
G1, Europe 11.3% 4.9% 7% 263.2 55%
G2, Europe 11.4% 7.1% 7% 28.3 18%
Source: C-QIS.
10   Temporary impacts were assessed by the Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG) established by FSB and BCBS, the permanent ones by BCBS’s Long-
term Economic Impact (LEI) Group. As the above analyses were carried out on the basis of the 2009 consultation recommendations, BIS will make an 
updated analysis relying on the finalised regulations approved in September 2010. 
11   IIF results are the outcome of the analysis of a complex scenario where the combined effects of liquidity, capital, leverage, trading book and other 
regulations (e.g. those pertaining to a bank levy) are taken into consideration. In addition, the assumed date of introduction for the complete rule 
book is 2012; therefore, one-off adjustment impacts reflect a sharper fall. (For further differences, see later.)MNB BulletiN • DeceMBer 2010 37
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A Basel Committee workgroup assessing the costs of the 
transition summed up the findings of 89 models, run on 
various countries, by the participating Member States using 
different methods. Analysts adopted a two-step approach 
to analysing the macro-economic effects of higher capital 
requirements. The first step is the assumption that banks 
will meet higher capital and profitability requirements via 
higher lending spreads. The second is that impacts on 
macro-economic variables, including consumption, 
investment and growth, are assessed on the basis of the 
lending spreads and volumes thereby calculated (Table 4). 
Estimates of the BIS workgroup show a substantially milder 
impact on GDP growth than those by the IIF. According to 
the former, GDP will be 0.24% lower by 2019, in relation to 
the ‘unregulated’ baseline scenario. There is a roughly 
twenty-fold difference between the two calculations, which 
can be attributed to a number of factors. One of the 
fundamental differences is that the Basel Committee 
workgroup assessed the growth impact of the capital 
requirements partially, while IIF prepared its calculations 
for the regulatory package as a whole, of which tighter 
capital requirements are only one component. Furthermore, 
the assumptions of the two groups of analysts also differ in 
terms of baseline scenarios, because IIF experts used pre-
crisis levels as a benchmark in assessing the impact of the 
framework on both banking activity and credit growth.
Banking system-related and macro-economic impacts in 
Hungary
According to MNB’s assessment, the new rules are not 
expected to have major impacts on large domestic banks, 
due to their conservative capital structure (first pillar) and 
to the actually high level of conservative capital components 
(second pillar).
Based on August 2010 data, we have quantified the 
additional capital that major actors in the domestic banking 
system would have to hold in order to meet the new 
requirements. Of the major banks, only one fails to comply 
with the Tier 1 capital requirements. One more bank would 
fail to comply with the 10.5% capital requirement which 
takes into consideration, in addition to CET1, both Tier 2 
and hybrid capital instruments, were this requirement 
already binding. Based on current figures, the total 
additional capital need of the domestic banking system is 
HUF 22 billion, which is equal to 0.87% of the capital stock.
Using the MNB’s own methodology, we assessed the macro-
economic impact of such an additional amount of capital 
over an 8-year adjustment period. Under our assumption, if 
the required capital of the banking system increases, 
adjustment may take place fundamentally via two channels. 
One is by making up for the shortfall in regulatory capital, 
i.e. through capital increases. The other is by reducing risk-
weighted assets to an extent where the capital requirement 
reaches the required level. We conducted our calculations 
assuming that adjustment occurred via capital increases 
and reduction in assets in an equal measure. Reduction in 
assets occurs by banks not rolling over expiring loans. We 
assume that banks will first adjust through corporate 
lending for as long as reasonably possible, then through 
household lending. Some (in our calculations: one-half) of 
the credit portfolio that is not rolled over may be assigned 
to other banks, as a result of which the decrease in 
12   We calculated the required increase in capital requirements on the basis of C-QIS data in a manner that it was established as a proportion of the 
capital shortfall to the current level of capital for large and medium size banks.
table 3
iiF estimates for the impact of new regulatory standards on GDP 
A change in real GDP in response to a 1% 
increase in the capital requirement by 
2019
total actual increase in the capital 
requirement from 2011 to 2019
A change in real GDP in response to an 





BiS projection for the impacts of the new capital requirements on GDP
A change in real GDP in response to a 1% 
increase in the capital requirement by 
2019
total actual increase in the capital 
requirement from 2011 to 2019
A change in real GDP in response to an 
actual increase in the capital requirement 
by 2019
−0.1% 2.4%12 −0.24%
Source: BIS.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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aggregate credit supply is more moderate than the 
adjustment by the individual banks.
A credit supply shock caused by banks’ adjustment will 
restrain production as it constrains lending to corporations. 
Tightening household lending reduces consumption directly, 
thereby deepening economic downturn on the supply-side. 
In calculating macro-economic impacts, we relied on the 
MNB’s forecast model.13 Our findings (Table 5) reveal that, 
where the above HUF 22 billion capital increase materializes, 
achieving compliance with the capital requirements during 
the 8-year transition period may lead to a 0.07−0.12% 
decline in GDP relative to the baseline scenario.
According to a study published by two staff members at 
Bankárképző (Somogyi and Trinh, 2010), the impacts of a 
stricter definition of capital and heightened capital 
requirements will be more dramatic. The study, while 
assuming that national authorities will initiate a counter-
cyclical capital buffer in the maximum possible amount,14 
forecasts HUF 140-150 billion in additional capital need by 
the end of 2012. This amounts to approximately 6% of the 
banking system’s current level of regulatory capital. As it is 
roughly seven times as high as the MNB’s forecast, it is 
worth comparing the two systems of assumptions and the 
two methods. A detailed comparison is shown in Table 6.
Liquidity rules
Banking system-related and macro-economic impacts in 
the EU
As for the European banking system, the introduction of the 
LCR and the NSFR will require adjustment on the part of 
large, international and medium-size banks alike, as both 
their LCR and NSFR fail to meet prescribed levels (Table 7). 
table 5
MNB forecast of the impact of changes in the capital requirements on GDP
A change in real GDP in response to a 1% 
increase in the capital requirement by 
2019
total actual increase in the capital 
requirement from 2011 to 2019
A change in real GDP in response to an 
actual increase in the capital requirement 
by 2019
−0.63 − −1.05% 0.11% −0.07 − −0.12%
Source: MNB.
table 6
Major causes of differences in national forecasts
Different results:
  Bankárképző MNB
New capital requirement ratio (%) 13 10.5
Additional capital need (HUF billion) 150 22
Reduced credit supply due to balance sheet adjustment (%) 7 1
Deviation of GDP from the baseline scenario −1.92 −0.12
Impact of 1% decrease in credit supply on GDP 0.2 0.2
Different assumptions:
  Bankárképző MNB
MKB’s capital increase (HUF 50 billion) taken into account No Yes
Bank levy taken into account Yes No
Restoration of capitalization
Exclusively through adjustments in 
lending
Partly with parent bank capital, 
partly through adjustments in 
lending
Interbank substitutability of adjustments in lending No 50% substitutability
Source: MNB, Somogyi and Trinh (2010).
13   The direct model results forecast the impacts of an increase in capital requirements subsequent to a shock, where the increase materialises over 
1-1.5 year(s). By contrast, impacts of regulatory changes will take as long as 8 years to emerge. In quantifying the impact on GDP for this longer 
period, we relied on the adjustment paths of the BIS and the IIF over different time horizons.
14   According to the communication of the Basel Committee (BCBS 2010), the earliest possible date for its introduction is 2016, but even then it will have 
to be phased in gradually.MNB BulletiN • DeceMBer 2010 39
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These new requirements are expected to put immense 
pressure on the markets. However, it should be added that 
results presented here are based on current balance sheet 
structures. Asset-side adjustment may help comply with the 
prescribed ratios, especially in light of the fact that these 
two ratios will only be in full force from 2019 onwards. The 
question is, however, how (partial or full) asset-side 
adjustment is likely to affect Europe’s economic growth.
The workgroup of the Basel Committee assessed the 
economic impacts of the introduction of new liquidity 
standards separately from the anticipated effects of new 
capital requirements. Their model was based on a 25% rise in 
liquid assets and the prolongation of the remaining maturity 
of wholesale liabilities. Their calculations suggest that, over 
a four-and-a-half-year period following the introduction of 
the standards, lending will fall by 3.2%, which leads to 0.08% 
lower GDP relative to the baseline scenario.
Banking system-related and macro-economic impacts in 
Hungary
When assessing the impact of new liquidity standards in 
Hungary, it is important that direct and indirect impacts be 
treated separately. Parent banks’ measures to improve 
liquidity may, indirectly, also affect the liquidity of the 
domestic banking system. As the reliance of domestic 
subsidiaries on foreign − mainly parent bank − financing is 
high, any possible deleveraging may lead to difficulties in 
financing the stock of foreign currency-denominated loans. 
A further indirect impact is that, if European banks decide 
to cut back on lending in response to the high liquidity 
standards, this will affect growth in the domestic corporate 
sector as well, due to the economic integration.
The direct impact of the liquidity standards on the domestic 
banking system is moderate. Nevertheless, in interpreting 
the national calculations, it is important to bear it in mind 
that they reflect one-off data for late 2009 and early 2010. 
In this period banking activity was relatively subdued. It is 
safe to say, therefore, that figures for a more active period 
would show a less balanced picture.
Our survey based fundamentally on the calculations of the 
individual banks shows that the mandatory use of the LCR 
is unlikely to have a significant impact on the banking 
system. Discussions with banks underpinned our assumption 
that they will not have to adjust in order to comply with a 
ratio exceeding 100%. As regards the NSFR, several large 
domestic banks currently fail to meet the new standards 
and therefore, over the long term, some change in the 
structure of financing will be unavoidable in Hungary as 
well. In order for the NSFR of all the banks surveyed to 
exceed 100%, overall, HUF 850 billion will have to be raised 
in long-term funds, but of this, only HUF 11 billion will be 
needed for the new liquidity ratio to be complied with if 
short-term financing from parent banks can be turned into 
funds with maturity of over 1 year. It should also be noted 
that these calculations are based on the current structure 
of banks’ balance sheet, and thus, in principle, credit side 
adjustment until 2018 cannot be ruled out either. There 
may be less need for such adjustment if additional resources 
can be raised as a result of households’ improved savings 
position. As the regulations treat short-term retail 
resources15 quite favourably, we do not expect lending to be 
cut back on or loan origination to be reduced as a direct 
impact of the new liquidity ratios.
Bankárképző’s calculations lead to similar conclusions, 
although there are significant differences in terms of 
quantitative results in this case as well. The most important 
difference is that the MNB only assessed the liquidity 
requirements of large domestic banks and relied 
predominantly on the banks’ own calculations. Another 
difference is that MNB data pertain to the end of 2009, 
Bankárképző’s to 2010 Q2. This accounts for the difference 
between the two calculations, especially in the case of the 
more volatile LCR. Table 8 compares the two sets of 
calculations.
As regards the introduction of the new liquidity ratios, in 
Hungary due consideration will have to be given to the 
question of the extent to which international standards 
prescribing higher short- and medium-term liquidity can 
handle the domestic banking system’s complex problem 
table 7
Anticipated impact of the new liquidity standards on europe’s capital markets − C-qiS 
liquidity coverage ratio (lCR) (%) Net stable funding ratio (NSFR) (%)
G1, Europe 66.5 91.1
G2, Europe 87.1 93.9
Source: C-QIS.
15 Banks can expect even short-term retail and SME deposits to be rolled over to a 80% and 90% degree respectively.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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arising from the simultaneous existence of on-balance sheet 
open FX positions and maturity mismatches. Regarding FX 
positions, banks’ ability to absorb shocks can, in principle, 
be improved through the Hungarian supervisory authority’s 
decision to the effect that banks will be expected to hold a 
30-day liquidity buffer in the prescribed breakdown by 
currencies. Nevertheless, prior to such a step being taken, 
further calculations will have to be made, because, in view 
of the limited availability of market liquidity and impacts on 
profitability, there is no guarantee that banks will opt for 
this kind of adjustment.
loNG-teRM iMPliCAtioNS oF 
oPeRAtioN iN ACCoRDANCe WitH tHe 
NeW RuleS
Besides the above impacts, the introduction of the new 
regulations may also have permanent, long-term 
implications. Temporary impacts originate from the one-off 
adjustment of banks to the new requirements (i.e. 
compliance with the higher capital and liquidity 
requirements), while the permanent, long-term effects 
derive from banks’ more stable operation under the stricter 
regulations.
Studying the long-term macro-economic impacts, the Basel 
workgroup used literature on banking crises as its starting 
point, gauging the extent by which more stringent capital 
and liquidity requirements will be able to reduce the 
likelihood of a banking crisis. This was compared with the 
costs of previous banking crises (in terms of the departure 
of GDP from its pre-crisis baseline scenario); the long-term 
benefits of the introduction of Basel III were estimated from 
reduction in costs and in the probability of the occurrence 
of a crisis. This was contrasted with those costs of 
compliance with the new regulations incurred by more 
expensive credit that lead to lower GDP relative to its 
baseline scenario. Results suggest that, overall, the 
introduction of Basel III will have favourable implications: 
stricter capital and liquidity standards may − according to 
best-case scenario figures − increase output by as much as 
2% annually compared with the baseline scenario. The 
forecast of more conservative models is, however, for a 
close to 0% impact. The workgroup itself pointed out − 
without citing concrete methodological problems − that its 
forecasts were rather uncertain.
iSSueS RelevANt to HuNGARy
In the course of the future drafting of the new regulations 
as an EU directive and during their implementation in 
Hungary, regulators will have to make decisions on the 
following currently open issues on the basis of the 
characteristics and existing risks of the domestic banking 
system. As at end of 2010, based on its duties and macro-
prudential tasks, the MNB believes that an official stance 
will have to be adopted on the following issues: 
1.   liquid assets eligible for the calculation of the lCR: 
many of the assets that the ECB (and the majority of 
central banks) considers (consider) to be eligible 
collateral are not included in the liquid asset buffer. A 
possible consequence could be that the majority of the 
banks will have to turn to the central bank for assets 
eligible as liquidity buffer components against central 
bank-eligible assets as collateral. As a result, the quality 
of central bank collateral will deteriorate, and, contrary 
to the purpose of the regulations, reliance on the central 
bank will increase rather than decrease.
2.   lCR: a liquidity buffer in a breakdown by currencies: 
regulators require banks’ liquidity buffers to be available 
in a manner that corresponds to the currency composition 
of outflows on the liabilities side, i.e. they assume that 
in a stress situation swap markets freeze. However, the 
supervisory authority may allow banks to generate the 
buffer in HUF rather than by currencies. On the basis of 
experience related to earlier crises, a decision should be 
made whether such practice can, from the perspective 
of the stability of the system, be supported.
3.   NSFR and the treatment of parent bank funding: the 
most critical requirement for domestic banks is that they 
will have to treat short-term parent bank funds as 
interbank loans with zero weight. As only parent bank 
funds with maturity of over one year count in the ratio, 
table 8
Anticipated impacts of the new liquidity standards in Hungary according to the calculations of Bankárképző 
and the MNB
Bankárképző MNB
LCR (%) 119 160
NSFR (%) 88 90
Liquidity shortfall (HUF billion) 2,688 850
Source: MNB, Somogyi and Trinh (2010).MNB BulletiN • DeceMBer 2010 41
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if the financing structure of the subsidiaries remains 
unchanged, the maturity of parent bank loans will have 
to be prolonged considerably. The question is whether 
parent banks will be willing to do so.
4.   NSFR of banks financed from the capital market: the 
problem facing banks financed primarily from the capital 
market is a sudden ‘drying up’ as funds become short 
term when the remaining maturity falls below one year. 
This is partly remediable through diversification of their 
maturity structure, but its efficacy is limited due to the 
limited availability of funds with different maturity.
5.    Definition of systemic level stress and excessive 
credit growth: this is the first time that new regulations 
have allocated tools of fundamentally micro-prudential 
regulation (i.e. capital buffers) to an expressly macro-
prudential objective. Both buffers will require 
supervisory authorities to think in a new way and take 
into account more aspects than before. Especially, the 
calibration and the timing of the use of the counter-
cyclical capital buffer intended to track the cyclical 
movements of the financial system and ensure the 
generation of reserves that are sufficient at a systemic 
level is a task that will likely to require closer 
co-ordination between the competent national and 
international authorities.
6.    Costs of the services of central clearing houses: 
under the BCBS’s proposals published in July 2010, 
exposures to central clearing houses will no longer 
receive a zero risk weight; they will be subject to a low 
risk weight, proposed at 1% to 3%. A decrease, due to 
additional costs, in the number of those intending to 
take positions in HUF diminished would hit the domestic 
banking system’s access to FX swaps adversely.
7.   evading  regulation: as tighter regulations will apply 
exclusively to the banking system, risks are likely to be 
shifted outside the sector as a way of minimising adverse 
impacts on profitability. Therefore, from the perspective 
of systemic stability, one of the challenges is to identify 
and limit the risks posed by unregulated sectors. 
CoNCluSioNS
Overall, based on the foregoing, we conclude that the new 
regulations are not expected to have material direct effects 
on the Hungarian banking system. At the level of the nine 
largest domestic banks, additional capital in an amount of 
HUF 22 billion, equal to 0.87% of the current capital stock, 
will be required. As regards liquidity, if short-term parent 
bank funding can be turned into funds with maturity of over 
one year, long-term resources in an amount of HUF 11 
billion will have to be raised. Nevertheless, to a lesser 
extent due to movements in the European money and 
capital markets, and, to a greater extent due to some 
impacts directly through parent banks, some reduction in 
growth at the national level cannot be ruled out.
It is worth tapping the hidden potential of the new global 
regulations, i.e. it is worth finding out whether they can 
help reduce any macro-prudential risks specific to Hungary. 
In the MNB’s opinion it is worth assessing the extent to 
which the new liquidity regulations can be used to address 
issues specific to Hungary (e.g. the simultaneous existence 
of on-balance sheet FX open positions and maturity 
mismatches).
As a closing note, it is important to stress that calculations 
used as the basis for the industry and regulatory conclusions 
presented herein relate to one specific point of time, and 
rely on different regulatory packages. Therefore, repeated 
reviews of the regulatory package will have to be carried 
out prior to its implementation.
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table 9
Proposals of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(December 2009)
Market failure Regulatory proposals
The amount of actually available capital decreased consistently, and 
the amount of capital at the time of the outbreak of the crisis was 
only partially able to absorb losses. Significant government 
intervention in the form of capital injection was required. 
Revised definition of capital:
Tier 1 – going concern capital: common equity + flexible interest-
bearing non-maturity hybrid capital
Tier 2 – gone concern capital: subordinated loan capital
Banks relied on the interbank market to ensure their short-term and 
long-term liquidity to an increasingly large extent. Once market 
liquidity became scarce, large-scale central bank and government 
interventions had to be made. 
International liquidity standards based on stress scenarios:
•   Short-term (30 days) – LCR: liquid assets/outflows on the liabilities 
side ≥1
•   Long-term – NSFR: liabilities with maturity of over 1 year/short-
term assets to be financed ≥ 1 
One of the major contributors to the crisis was the increasingly lax 
lending standards of banks. After the onset of the crisis, impacts 
were exacerbated by the fact that, in a bleak market environment, 
banks cut back on lending excessively. As a result, the financial crisis 
turned into a real economy crisis.
Measures to reduce pro-cyclicity:
• Mitigation of the pro-cyclical nature of the Basel ii regulations
•   Forward-looking accounting provisioning (on an expected rather 
than incurred loss basis)
• Prescription of capital reserves on the level of the individual banks
• Prescription of systemic level capital reserves
There was not enough capital to cover the risks posed by interbank 
trading; losses were mainly due to the deterioration in counterparties’ 
credit rating, a situation that regulations had failed to address.
Enhanced capital requirements for trading and counterparty risks:
• Stress VAr with a holding period of 1 year
•   Application of a 1.25 multiplier to counterparties in the financial 
sector
•   counterparty risk on the basis of the probability of default and 
deterioration in their credit rating
•   A move to clear Otc derivatives contracts through ccP’s
Build-up of huge on- and off-balance sheet leveraged positions, with 
regulatory capital requirements being met.
Definition of leverage ratio:
Tier 1 capital/unweighted on- and off-balance sheet assets
When the risks posed by systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs) materialised, governments had to recapitalise them in order 
to reduce the risk of spill-over and real economic impacts. As a 
result, the moral hazard of similar institutions grew.
Supplementary regulations applicable to systemically important 
financial institutions. (At the time of the drafting of the proposal, 
requirements for additional capital and liquidity and the involvement 
unsecured debtors in loss absorption were laid down.)
ANNeX